Why People Stay in Cults: Brainwashing Doesn't Explain It
Why Didn't People Leave Jonestown? What Brainwashing Misses
Something has shifted in how this country argues. Left and right circle each other like opposing armies, and neither side seems able to say the other's belief out loud without sneering at it. Compromise reads as weakness now. An opponent's argument isn't something to sit with; it's something to defeat, the way you'd answer an enemy, not a neighbor.
This isn't an article about who's right. It's a harder question: why do we reach for hatred before we reach for understanding? What taught us that? What story, what image, what repeated line got us here?
Maybe the problem was never the belief itself. Maybe it's how a belief gets built: the story told over and over, the conviction that our side is right and the other side is dangerous, the quiet rule that doubting out loud counts as betrayal. Are we actually deciding for ourselves, or is something closer to a technique doing some of that deciding for us?
What Propaganda, Cults, and Empires Actually Have in Common
Read across the material and the same few techniques keep surfacing in places that never spoke to each other. Nobody circulated a manual. They just keep turning up.
People can stay in cults for reasons that have little to do with brainwashing: restricted access to outside information, rewards for public displays of loyalty, dependence on the group, and a rising cost of leaving. The same kinds of pressure turn up in state propaganda and in imperial rule. That is a pattern repeating across very different cases, not proof of one shared mechanism.
That recurrence is what's hard to let go of, and it's also what's easy to overstate. A marriage, a jungle settlement, and a state hold radically different legal powers, different capacities for violence, and different consequences for walking away.
Between 1925 and 1945, Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf moved more than 12 million copies, a worldview distributed like a consumer product for two decades. Peoples Temple never reached anything close to that many people.
What it left instead is a tape archive: recordings the FBI released under public-records law, transcribed at the Jonestown Institute by Fielding McGehee III.
On New Year's Day 1976, in California, Jim Jones told his inner circle that the FBI and CIA were about to kill them. Then came the wine, which he said was poisoned. It was not.
Devin Ross, whose monograph works through those transcripts, calls it the first suicide drill. Before that day, revolutionary suicide was something Jones talked about. After it, the group had practiced it, nearly three years ahead of Guyana.
Twelve million copies, printed across twenty years. One day of rehearsal with wine that was never poisoned.
Neither scene explains how it worked. What both show is belief performed in front of other people rather than held privately. By October 1978, at a meeting in Jonestown, a member named Michael Prokes said he saw "no other viable alternative."
I came at this from the other end. An earlier piece in this series looked at the cruel-then-kind rhythm behind gaslighting inside one relationship, and what I couldn't shake afterward was how much of that description also fit things that happen at the scale of a country.
Where "Brainwashing" Stops Explaining Anything
The word people reach for is "brainwashing": one person, or one ideology, flipping a switch inside someone else's head. It's a tidy story. The research does not support treating it as a complete explanation.
In 1979, J. T. Ungerleider and D. K. Wellisch published a study in the American Journal of Psychiatry that interviewed and psychologically tested fifty people drawn from various religious groups, some still members and some who had left. All of them had approached the authors themselves, over the question of deprogramming. The researchers went looking for the kind of impairment that word implies, something close to legal insanity. They didn't find it.
That result has real limits, and they matter. The sample selected itself. It was not a study of Peoples Temple, and it says nothing about the state of anyone at Jonestown. What it does undercut is the comfortable assumption that people who end up inside high-control religious groups must have lost the ordinary capacity to reason.
Ross's monograph, published on the Jonestown Institute's site, resists a single-cause explanation as well. Not Jones's charisma alone, but that charisma, the members' own dealings with one another, and pressure from outside, propping each other up.
It's hard not to suspect that part of the appeal of "brainwashing" is that it puts the failure in the follower rather than in the structure around them. What that structure actually consisted of is where the research splits.
Why Researchers Still Disagree About Jonestown
So how should anyone read it: manipulation, genuine belief, or something that fits neither word? Three papers bear on it, and part of why they don't line up is that they were not asking the same thing.
Ross was asking about Jones himself. Was he a charismatic leader, and how did that kind of authority take hold? He works mainly from the transcribed tapes.
The 1979 psychiatric study asked a narrow clinical question about religious-group members generally and answered it narrowly. Then Erin Martine Sessions and Bernard Doherty, writing in Implicit Religion, put the vocabulary itself under suspicion.
That third one is easy to read as simply proposing a better label. It isn't what they say.
Coercive control is Evan Stark's term for the dynamics of abusive relationships. Coercive persuasion is the older theory once applied to new religious groups. The authors point out some common ground between the two. Where it goes wrong, they argue, is in the borrowing.
Some writers in cultic studies, and some in domestic-violence research, took the newer vocabulary and used it to bring back the old brainwashing rhetoric, which the authors call problematic. That, in their account, is unhelpful to abuse victims at both ends: those in violent homes and those inside religious groups.
What I take from their objection is narrower. Look at conduct you can point at: isolation, surveillance, threats, economic manipulation, control over the small decisions of daily life. Not a takeover of someone's mind, which you have to assume.
None of this required the people who stayed to be careless or unintelligent, which lines up with why smart people fall for scams: the vulnerability tends to sit in the structure of a situation rather than in a shortage of intelligence.
Three papers, three questions, no shared verdict. Between them, though, they make brainwashing look less like an answer than a placeholder for one. The harder question is what else was going on.
The Numbers That Don't Settle It
Put the numbers side by side and none of them closes the question. Twelve million copies of one book. And a Jonestown security team that Devin Ross, citing Rebecca Moore, puts at only about sixty people, watching a settlement of roughly a thousand.
Sixty guards, about the size of two crowded school classes, for a community of a thousand.
It's tempting to read that arithmetic as proof that force was secondary. Ross does use the number that way. It is his rebuttal to the earliest explanations, the ones that had armed men holding an entire settlement in place.
But a head count cannot measure how free anyone was to leave, and a small guard force in that setting is not the same as a small threat. One more detail sits in the same record. Jones spoke over the settlement's public address system throughout the day, interpreting the outside world for people who had almost no other way to hear about it.
Rome met a version of the same limit centuries earlier. The Encyclopedia of the Roman Army's entry on psychological warfare describes fear and threat as real Roman instruments, aimed at enemies and used to hold allies in line. But Roman rule also ran on administration, taxation, and the cooperation of local elites. Intimidation mattered, and it was never the whole system.
The United States wrote its own version of that limit into a strategy document. A 1953 State Department memo on psychological warfare put policy first and stated flatly that "actions are the best propaganda." It's a strange thing to read beside the Jonestown guard count and the Nazi propaganda ministry, because it arrives, from the other side of the Cold War, at the same boundary the evidence keeps hitting.
A message can organize belief. It doesn't appear able to substitute for what people actually experience.
The One Thing That Goes Missing at Every Scale
Line up the intimate version of this pattern, the communal one, and the imperial one, and the same thing tends to be missing from all three: an open door. Not comfort. Not agreement. Somewhere to check a claim against an outside source, someone to say a doubt to without risking the relationship, and a way out that doesn't cost everything.
Nazi propaganda never worked on its own. It ran alongside real punishment for dissent and a censorship apparatus that, in the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum's account, worked together with it. It did not need every reader persuaded of every claim. It benefited when public disagreement became isolating and dangerous enough that most people stopped voicing it.
The Jonestown record points in the same direction without settling the weight of any one factor. And empires that ruled through open, undisguised force still needed local elites willing to cooperate, which reads to me less like loyalty than arithmetic.
None of that requires charisma, cruelty, or an evil genius doing the planning. It requires narrowing what a person can check, who they can say it to, and what leaving would cost.
That's my own way of describing the overlap, not a model anyone has established, and I'd hold it loosely. But it's the plainest answer I can give to the question this piece opened with.
Not one shared psychology. Not a coincidence either. Three pressures that keep recurring, which any relationship, group, or government can turn up or down without ever naming what they're doing.
Neither side's belief looks wrong from the inside. That's the part that stays with me. People who say genuinely cruel things to each other, across this divide, mean it when they say they love this country.
One side calls it defense. The other calls it change. The love isn't the problem.
The problem starts the moment that love turns the person across from you into an enemy you no longer have to understand, the moment doubt gets treated like betrayal.
Agitation rarely opens with an unfamiliar idea. It usually just turns up the volume on something we already wanted to believe, or already feared. So the useful question probably isn't how to dismantle what the other side believes. It's smaller than that: where did my own version of the story come from, what does it let me see, and what does it keep me from checking?
I'm not arguing for a winner here. I'm hoping love of country stops being the tool that gets used to make us hate each other. People don't only get manipulated for evil ends. Sometimes the easiest way in is through the thing they're trying hardest to protect.
Frequently asked questions
How many people died at Jonestown?
The Jonestown Institute counts 918 deaths in Guyana on November 18, 1978: 909 in Jonestown itself, five at the Port Kaituma airstrip, and four at the Temple's headquarters in Georgetown. The five at the airstrip, killed earlier that day, were Congressman Leo Ryan, three journalists traveling with him, and one person who had chosen to leave.
Could anyone leave Jonestown?
Sixteen residents left with Ryan's delegation on the second day of its visit, and that departure is part of what set off the hours after. Temple security tracked them six miles to the airstrip and attacked as the plane loaded. Whether leaving was realistic for the roughly nine hundred who stayed is what the records do not settle.
Was Nazi propaganda mostly lies?
Not in any simple sense. In the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum's account, some of it was invention, such as the myths that made Jews into both a threat and a drain on Germany. But the museum also quotes Hitler's 1924 view that it was not propaganda's job to weigh the truth fairly when the truth favored the enemy. Leaving things out was part of the method.
Is it accurate to call political opponents "brainwashed" or "cult-like"?
Applying either term to people you disagree with stretches it well past what it was built for. Both describe a relationship a person is inside of, with specific things being done to them. A voter who reads different news is not in that relationship.
Sources & references
- United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, "Nazi Propaganda"
- United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, "Nazi Propaganda and Censorship"
- United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, "Mein Kampf"
- Devin Ross, "Culture, Charisma and Peoples Temple," Jonestown Institute, San Diego State University
- Jonestown Institute, "How many people died on November 18?" San Diego State University
- U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Volume VIII
- Erin Martine Sessions and Bernard Doherty, "‘Cults,’ Coercion, and Control: Rhetoric, Reality, and the Return of ‘Brainwashing’?", Implicit Religion 24(2)
- "Psychological Warfare," The Encyclopedia of the Roman Army
- J. T. Ungerleider and D. K. Wellisch, "Coercive persuasion (brainwashing), religious cults, and deprogramming," American Journal of Psychiatry, 1979
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